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ABSTRACT
Countries around the world differ substantially in the relative importance of their banks and capital
markets in providing investment financing. This paper examines one potential explanation for the
cross-country differences in the importance of banks and capital market financing of investment. It
is our contention that much of the variation across countries in the depth and breadth of capital
markets can be explained by a combination of the existence of deposit insurance and the extent to
which a country's banking system is state owned. We provide both an equilibrium model predicting
and empirical evidence showing that countries with explicit deposit insurance and a high degree of
state-owned bank assets have smaller equity markets, a lower number of publicly traded firms and
a smaller amount of bank credit to the private sector. Finally, our results suggest that the effects of












Atlanta, GA 303221 Introduction
Capital markets serve an essential purpose in the growth and development of modern economies.
T h e yp r o v i d ef o rt h ee ﬃcient channeling of funds from savers to investors. There are two
basic methods for ﬁnancing capital investment: primary issuance of equity or bonds, and
securing of bank loans. Looking around the world, we see that countries diﬀer substantially
in the relative importance of banks and capital markets in providing investment ﬁnancing.
Equity market capitalization currently ranges from close to zero in countries like Austria,
Argentina and Greece to nearly 2 times GDP in the UK, South Africa and Malaysia. The
importance of bank loan ﬁnancing is essentially the mirror image of this. What accounts
for the cross-country diﬀerences in the importance of banks and capital market ﬁnancing of
investment?
The purpose of this paper is to address this question directly. It is our contention that
much of the variation across countries in the depth and breadth of capital markets can be
explained by a combination of the existence of deposit insurance and the extent to which a
country’s banking system is state owned.
Because of the importance of ﬁnancial intermediation, and the diﬃculties associated with
potential bank failures, governments in most countries have established a set of institutional
structures to insure the stability of their banking systems. Primary among these is the
creation of deposit insurance. By insuring deposits, banks’ liability holders are signiﬁcantly
less likely to request the return of callable deposits, reducing the chances of bank runs. But
at the same time, deposit insurance subsidizes bank risk-taking activities and allows the
payment of lower interest rates to depositors.1 This channels money through banks, and
1See Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) who use a cross-country sample to show that deposit insurance
decreases rates of return paid by banks, reduces market discipline faced by banks and their managers, and
increases banks’ risk taking. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002)
extend this analysis, ﬁnding that deposit insurance increases the probability of banking crises and ﬁnancial
1away from ﬁnancial markets. Direct state bank ownership has a similar impact.2
We present a simple, three sector model, in which the economy is composed of ﬁrms,
banks and households. The ﬁrms require operating capital and can obtain it either through
equity issuance or from bank loans. Banks take deposits from households and make loans to
ﬁrms, while households both allocate their wealth and purchase the ﬁrms’ output. The model
allows us to show how increases in deposit insurance (or the percentage of the banking system
that is state owned) both reduces the size of the capital market and shrinks the amount of
bank credit to the private sector, and may decrease the number of ﬁrms seeking equity
ﬁnancing.
In order to examine the predictions of the model, we study a data set composed of
49 countries. Of these, 33 currently have explicit deposit insurance and 42 have some state
ownership of banks, ranging from less than 2 percent to almost 90 percent. The data conﬁrm
the predictions of the model. An increase in either state bank ownership or presence of
deposit insurance both decreases the size of capital markets and the extent of bank lending.
For example, we would predict that decreasing the percentage of the banking system that
is state owned from 36%, as it is in Italy, to zero would increase in the size of the capital
market from less than 10 percent to over 30 percent of GDP and a raise in the level of bank
l e n d i n gf r o m5 7p e r c e n tt oc l o s et o9 0p e r c e n to fG D P .
Our conclusions are in contrast with those in La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny (1997), who study the relationship between law and ﬁnance. La Porta, et. al note the
importance of the countries’ legal system in determining the structure of the ﬁnancial system.
In particular, they point out that investors provide capital to ﬁr m so n l yi ft h e yb e l i e v et h e y
will get their money back. For equity holders, this means that they must be able to vote
instability. Finally, Cull, Senbet and Sorge (2004) ﬁnd that generous deposit insurance may lead to ﬁnancial
instability in lax regulatory environments.
2See Barth, Caprio Jr., and Levine (2001) and La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000).
2out directors and managers who do not pay them. For creditors and holders of bonds, this
means that they must have authority to repossess collateral. Furthermore, these nominal
legal rights must be accompanied by conﬁdence that the laws will be enforced. La Porta,
et. al go on to show that the depth of ﬁnancial markets depends crucially on the degree of
law enforcement in a country and the origin of a countries legal system, which they divide
into four families: English, German, Scandinavian and French. The results we present below
suggest that the extent of state bank ownership and nature of deposit insurance are more
important than the form of legal organization in determining a country’s ﬁnancial structure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The model developed in the section
2 allows us to study the impact of an increase in the level of deposit indemnity in a country.
These implications are tested in section 3 where we provide empirical evidence that deposit
insurance has a detrimental eﬀect on the development of both external capital and private
credit markets. We also ﬁnd that, once explicit deposit insurance and state-owned bank
assets are introduced into the analysis, the legal family origin variables lose importance
in explaining the diﬀerences between countries in the development of the external capital
markets. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We begin by developing an equilibrium model to study the eﬀects of explicit deposit insurance
and state ownership of banks on equity markets and ﬁnancial intermediation. Speciﬁcally,
the model shows that an increase in depositors’ protection leads households to shift their
assets out of capital markets and into banks, reducing their equity holdings. Furthermore,
an increase in bank deposit insurance also results in (i) a reduction in the amount of bank
credit to ﬁrms; and (ii) possibly a lower number of publicly traded ﬁrms.
3The economy consists of three sectors: manufacturing ﬁrms, banks and households. The
production sector is represented by n monopolistic competitors, each of which produces an
imperfectly substitutable good. Firms transform inputs into output, and their knowledge
of this technology is summarized by a parameter we call Ai, and they diﬀer in both their
Ai and their output price, Pi. All agents in the economy are uncertain as to whether the
productivity will be high (Ai)o rl o w( Ai) for an individual ﬁrm. Each ﬁrm’s objective is to
maximize expected proﬁts by choosing either of two sources of external ﬁnance -bank loans
or equity issuance- in order to purchase the factors of production.
In addition to ﬁrms, there is a competitive ﬁnancial sector composed of a representative
bank. The bank has zero expected proﬁts, but may go bankrupt. In the case of bankruptcy
households recover their deposits (or a fraction thereof) depending on the extent to which
t h eb a n ki si n s u r e d .
Finally, a representative household makes bank and equity investment decisions in order
to maximize expected utility from consumption across diﬀerent states of nature, taking
into account the (known) probabilities of high and low productivity and bankruptcy. The
household’s budget is given by its net returns on assets, which is state-dependent.
2.1 Production
Turning to the speciﬁcs of the model, each ﬁrm faces a decreasing returns to scale technology
for production and it uses either of the two perfectly substitutable means of ﬁnancing, exter-
nal capital or bank loans, in order to purchase the inputs for production, before uncertainty
about productivity is revealed. Since the only diﬀerence is the state-dependent productivity
4Ai, the production function of an individual ﬁrm i c a nb ew r i t t e na s :
Y i = Ai(Si + Li)
θ (1)
Y i = Ai(Si + Li)
θ
where Y i and Y i represent ﬁrm i’s production in the high (Ai)a n dl o w( Ai)p r o d u c t i v i t y
states, respectively (with Ai < Ai), and 0 <θ<1. πS is the probability of the low
productivity state (πS =P r ( Ai = Ai)), which is common for all ﬁrms.
We deﬁne P(Ai) as the price of ﬁrm i’s commodity, conditional on the state of nature Ai.
Li is the amount of bank loans demanded by the ﬁrm and rL its gross interest rate, which is
honored by the ﬁrm regardless of whether the productivity level is high or low.
Moving to the ﬁnancing decision, we deﬁne Si as the equity issued by the ﬁrm, and
assume that it pays a required gross return rS and rS to the stock holders in the high and
low productivity states, respectively. F(S) is the ﬁxed cost all ﬁrms must incur in order to
issue equity, and this must be paid before the productivity state is revealed. F(S) takes a
value of F if the ﬁrm issues stock and 0 otherwise.
Each ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize expected proﬁts:
(1 − πS)[P(Ai)Y i − rLLi − rSSi − F(S)] + πS[P(Ai)Y i − rLLi − rSSi − F(S)] (2)
subject to the technology in equation (1).
For simplicity, we assume that in the low productivity state all ﬁrms’ revenues are suﬃ-
ciently low that, in equilibrium, they pay a gross rate equal to zero to the residual claimants
5(equity holders). This normalization implies:
rS = rS , rS =0
Given the nature of the production function each ﬁrm will choose to ﬁnance its purchases
of inputs exclusively through either equity ﬁnancing or bank loans, depending on which
source is least expensive. If a ﬁrm i decides to ﬁnance production through equity issuance,
its expected proﬁts are:








1−θ − F (3)
On the other hand, if the ﬁrm chooses to use bank loans, expected proﬁts are given by:









Firms choose their means of ﬁnancing to maximize their proﬁts. It can be easily shown
that ﬁrms will choose bank loan ﬁnancing whenever the gross interest rates is lower than the
expected return they have to pay the share-holders (rL ≤ (1 − πS)rS).
If the gross interest rate exceeds the expected gross equity payment (rL > (1−πS)rS), the
choice between loan and equity ﬁnancing will depend on the size of the ﬁxed cost of issuing
shares. Combining equations (3) and (4), we can see that the ﬁrm will ﬁnance production
through equity issuance whenever the following condition holds:










where e Bi ≡ πSP(Ai)Ai +( 1− πS)P(Ai)Ai and K(θ) ≡ θ
−θ(1 − θ)−(1−θ).
6In those instances in which the inequality in equation (5) fails to hold, ﬁrms will obtain
loans to ﬁnance their production. We assume that, as a result, k ﬁrms choose equity ﬁnancing
while n − k ﬁrms obtain ﬁnancing from banks. This separating equilibrium, characterized














,S i =0 ,i ∈ {ik+1,...,in}
This solution allows us to study the impact of changes in the required rate of return on
ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decision. In particular, we note that an increase in equity rate of return
rS has two separate eﬀects. First, as rS increases, each ﬁrm’s individual demand for equity
falls. And second, a higher rS may lead some ﬁrms to shift from equity to loan ﬁnancing,
thereby reducing k.
2.2 Financial Intermediation
Turning to ﬁnancial intermediation, we assume the presence of a representative ﬁnancial
institution, a fraction φ ∈ [0,1] of which is owned by the government, and the remaining
(1 − φ) is owned by the private sector. The bank has deposit liabilities on which it pays a
gross rate of return rD, that it takes as given. Furthermore, the bank faces a probability
πD of bankruptcy. We make the simplifying assumption that bankruptcy only occurs in the
low productivity state [Prob(Ai = Ai|bankruptcy)=1 ] and that in this state households
recover only the fraction of deposits that is covered by insurance. We also assume there
are no reserve requirements, but allow the representative bank to hold excess reserves. This
implies that at all times the total level of deposits (D) exceeds the quantity of loans (L)
7made by the bank. That is, D ≥
P
i∈{ik+1,...,in} Li ≡ L.
The state-owned portion of the representative ﬁnancial intermediary is backed entirely
by the government. Therefore, in the event of a bank failure the government will step in and
return principal and interest to this fraction of depositors. Assuming that the government
makes zero expected proﬁts from this insurance policy, and that the state-owned portion of
the bank has a (constant) management cost per unit of deposits c1, the bank’s cost per unit
of deposits is:
cG = c1 + πDrD (7)
where the term πDrD equals the premium rate that the state-owned banks must to pay to
the government.
For the privately-owned part of the bank there exists the option of acquiring privately
supplied explicit deposit insurance, which insures a fraction λ ∈ (0,1) of deposits. The
fraction λ captures the fact that not all bank deposits are covered by insurance, and this
coverage may vary substantially across countries. Assuming that this scheme breaks even as
well, the costs for privately owned banks per unit of deposits are:
cP = c2 + λ(I)πDrD (8)
where c2 is the per unit of deposits management costs of private banks, and λ(I) is an
indicator variable which takes the value of λ if the explicit scheme is adopted and 0 other-
wise. Here, the term λ(I)πDrD represents the premium rate per unit of deposits for explicit
insurance purchased by a privately-owned banks.
The zero proﬁt assumption implies that the gross return on loans must be equal to the
8sum of the expected gross payoﬀ to depositors and the intermediation costs:
rLL =[ ( 1− πD)rD + φcG +( 1− φ)cP]D (9)
Substituting equations (8) and (9) into the right-hand side of equation (10) and dividing
through by L, we obtain an expression for the gross loan rate charged by the ﬁnancial
institution:
rL =[ ( 1− π
∗





D = πD(1 − φ)[1 − λ(I)] is the actual probability that asset holders will not receive
their bank deposits back. Clearly, π∗
D is lower when there is explicit deposit insurance and
when a higher proportion of the bank is state owned, as both of these reduce the probability
that the bank will default on its deposit liabilities.
2.3 Households
The representative household’s objective is to maximize expected utility from the consump-
tion of the n commodities produced by the ﬁrms. Income is provided by the net return on
assets, which will depend on the particular state of nature. There are three possible outcomes
that concern the household. In the ﬁrst, when there is a high productivity state, the house-
hold receives returns on their equity investments as well as having its bank deposits returned
safely. In this case, which occurs with probability (1−πS),i n c o m ei s(rS −1)S +(rD −1)D.
The second possibility, which occurs with probability (πS − π∗
D), is that productivity is in
the low state, and so equities return nothing, but bank deposits are returned. This leads to
an income of (rD −1)D. Finally, with probability π∗
D equities return nothing and banks are
bankrupt without insurance, and so income is zero.
9Assuming that households have power utility, they will maximize:
(1 − πS)C(A)
1





subject to the budget constraints:
P(A)C(A)=( rS − 1)S +( rD − 1)D (12)
P(A)C(A)=( rD − 1)D (13)

























Ai ∈ {Ai,A i} (17)
W is the agent’s total wealth (which we assume ﬁxed), γ is the inverse of the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion, α is the elasticity of substitution between goods in utility and πS
and π∗
D (as deﬁned in subsections 2.1 and 2.2) are the positive probabilities faced by the
household of losing its entire investment in stock shares and bank deposits, respectively.
It is straightforward to verify that the household’s demand for each asset will depend
directly on the asset’s own rate and inversely on the probability of default by the issuer.3
Equilibrium in the economy is achieved by the usual market clearing conditions in the goods
3See Technical Appendix for details.
10and asset contingent commodity markets.4
2.4 Comparative Statics and Testable Implications
We are interested in using the model to study the impact of both the introduction of
an explicit deposit insurance system and an increase in the share of the banking system
owned by the state on ﬁrm ﬁnancing. In particular, we study how each of these institutional
changes aﬀects the number of ﬁrms issuing equity, the extent of issuance and the amount of
bank credit extended.
In the model, explicit deposit insurance exists when the variable λ(I) in equation (8) is
greater than zero. We study this in three steps. First, we examine the impact on the house-
hold’s asset allocation decision, second we look at the consequence of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing
decision, and ﬁnally we ask about the eﬀect on bank lending activity.
Looking at the household, we see that an increase in λ(I) lowers π∗
D, the probability that
banks will not return depositor balances. Keeping k,t h en u m b e ro fﬁrms issuing equity,
ﬁxed,5 reduces π∗
D by πD(1−φ)λ, causing the asset holder to shift wealth away from equity
towards bank deposits. For a given rD, equity market equilibrium will require a higher yield
on stocks and a lower issuance of equity by individual ﬁrms.
By changing the required rate of return on equity, the introduction of deposit insurance
will also change the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing decision. This is ambiguous, and we do not know whether
fewer ﬁrms will issue equity following the change. To see why, consider the marginal equity
issuing ﬁrm as deﬁn e db yt h ec o n d i t i o ni ne q u a t i o n( 5 ) .T h i sﬁrm faces an increase in the
required return on equity that it would issue, but may also face an increase in the interest rate
4The reader is referred to Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) for an analogous derivation of the equilibrium
in the goods market.
5The model described in Section 3 does not give us an unambiguous answer as to whether or not k remains
ﬁxed. However, we assume for the comparative staics exercise that k remains unchanged to facilitate the
analysis.
11charged by the bank for a loan. If the increase in the expected return on equity, (1−πS)rS,
is larger than the increase in the loan rate, rL, then the marginal ﬁrm will turn from equity
to loan ﬁnancing.
Turning to the bank, we see that implementation of a deposit insurance system creates
an increase in the demand for bank deposits by the households, lowering π∗
D.A s a r e s u l t ,
the loan rate rL will increase for a given k, thereby reducing bank loans to the representative
ﬁrm.
Increasing the share of bank assets owned by the state is analogous to the introduction
of explicit deposit insurance. To see why, consider an increase in the parameter φ.A g a i n ,
π∗
D falls, raising the level of bank deposits and increasing the loan rate charged to ﬁrms. The
impact of the representative ﬁrm’s decision to issue equity is still ambiguous, although those
that do issue, reduce the amount.
These comparative statics results provide us with three testable hypotheses. Looking
across countries, we expect to see that those with either explicit deposit insurance or high
levels of state-bank ownership should have less equity issuance, a lower level of bank loan
ﬁnancing, and possibly fewer publicly traded ﬁrms. We now take these predictions to the
data.
3 Empirical Results
We now proceed to examine the impact of deposit insurance and state-bank ownership on
ﬁnancial markets using a cross-sectional data set composed of 49 countries. Our data sources
are described in the data appendix. Our empirical tests are based on regressions of the size of
external capital markets, the number of ﬁrms issuing equity and the extent of bank lending
on measures of the extent of state ownership of banks and the presence of explicit deposit
12insurance. We also include a set of controls, including measures of the growth and level of
GDP. As noted by La Porta, López de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), these variables are
likely to contribute to the degree of development of equity and debt markets in an economy.
Because of the linkage between law enforcement and the degree of external ﬁnance, we also
include the LLSV’s index measuring the “Rule of Law.”
We are interested in explaining variation in the ratio of (publicly held) stock mar-
ket capitalization to gross national product (External Capital/GNP), the ratio of bank
credit extended to the private sector to gross domestic product (Private Credit/GDP) and
the ratio of domestic ﬁrms listed in a given country to its population (Listed Domestic
Firms/Population). For each of these, we look at three sets of explanatory variables. In our
baseline speciﬁcation, we regress each one of the variables of interest on the controls, the
share of state-owned bank assets (as the proxy for implicit insurance) and a zero-one dummy
variable to account for the presence of explicit deposit insurance. This provides our baseline
set of results.
N e x t ,w es t u d yt h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo fd e p o s i ti n s u r a n c ea n ds t a t eo w n e r s h i po nt h e
one hand and legal origin on the other. To do this, we ﬁrst look at regression including only
the legal origin dummy variables (French, German and Scandinavian), and the controls. To
this we then add the deposit insurance measures.
3.1 Equity Market Size
Table 1 displays our results using External Capital as a ratio to GNP as the dependent
variable. If we only consider deposit insurance and state-owned bank assets (jointly with
the control variables) as regressors (labeled “Speciﬁcation 1”), the results are as predicted
by the model. Both explicit deposit insurance and state ownership are negatively correlated
13with on the ratio of the stock market capitalization to gross national product, although only
the coeﬃcient on the latter is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (at the 1% level).
Looking at the Speciﬁcation 3, we see that this result is robust to including the legal origin
dummy variables; the coeﬃcient of state owned banks slightly changes from -0.676 to -0.602,
b u ti tr e m a i n ss i g n i ﬁcant at the 1% level.
Table 1
Dependent variable: External Capital/GNP








































































Another important observation is that the legal origin variables lose explanatory power
when deposit insurance and state-owned bank assets are incorporated into the model. In the
14absence of the insurance variables, all of the legal origin dummies are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at the 5% level (with “French” being signiﬁcant at the 1% level). When deposit
insurance and state-bank ownership are included in the estimation, only the coeﬃcient of
French legal origin remains signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10% level. In fact, in
Speciﬁcation 3 we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all of the legal origin coeﬃcients
are jointly equal to zero (using a chi-squared test with heteroskedastic consistent errors) at
the 10% level. This suggests that the cross-country variation in the size of external capital
markets is better explained by the presence or absence of explicit or implicit deposit insurance
than it is by the origin of legal systems.
What are the quantitative implications of these results? In tables 2.A and 2.B we examine
two subsamples of countries: the Euro Area and Latin America. For the countries in each
subgroup, we present an estimate of the amount of the potential change in the external
capital/GNP ratio if these countries were to reduce their level of state-ownership of banks
to a benchmark level. For the Euro Area the benchmark is the percentage of state-owned
bank assets of the United Kingdom, whereas for the Latin American countries we use Chile
as the comparison.
Table 2.a
External Capital/GNP (EMU countries)












/1 Range of level of External Capital/GNP ratio for a fraction of
state-owned bank assets of 0% (figure for the UK).
15Table 2.b
External Capital/GNP (Latin-American countries)








/2 Range of level of External Capital/GNP ratio for a fraction of
state-owned bank assets of 19.72% (figure for Chile).
The results in these tables suggest that most Euro Area countries (especially Austria,
Italy, Germany, Portugal and Belgium) would experience signiﬁcant increases in the ratio
of external capital markets to GNP if they were to privatize their banking systems. For
example, we predict that if Italy were to privatize its banks, the external capital/GNP ratio
would move from 0.08 to 0.30. Similarly, all of the Latin American countries in the sample
(primarily Argentina, Venezuela and Colombia), could experience a rise in the size of their
external capital markets if they would move closer to Chile. By our estimates, Argentina
and Venezuela would sustain increases similar to those of Italy.
3.2 Credit to the Private Sector
Table 3 presents the results of the three speciﬁcations of the model using the Private Credit-
GNP as the dependent variable. As predicted by our model, we see that Private Credit/GNP
is lower in countries with explicit deposit insurance and a high proportion of state-owned
banks. The results reported in Speciﬁcation 1 show that both coeﬃcients of interests are
negative and statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. Once again, the
results are robust to incorporating the legal origin dummy variables.
16Table 3
Dependent variable: Private Credit/GDP








































































As in the previous case, the signiﬁcance of the legal origin variables is sensitive to the
inclusion of the deposit insurance variables. Introducing the explicit insurance and state-
owned bank assets regressors causes the German legal origin variable to become signiﬁcantly
positive at the 5% level (the wrong sign), whereas the Scandinavian legal origin variable is
no longer diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level.
To gauge quantitative importance, we again compare the Euro Area and Latin American
countries to the U.K. and Chile, respectively. In addition, we combine this eﬀect with the
17elimination of the explicit deposit insurance scheme to get approximate ranges for the po-
tential levels of the Private Credit/GDP ratio. Again, we ﬁnd sizeable eﬀects, with increases
in overall private credit by the order of 30% of GDP for many of the countries.
Table 4.a
Private Credit/GDP (EMU countries)












/1 Range of Private Credit/GDP ratio for a fraction of state-owned
bank assets of 0% (figure for the UK) and elimination of explicit
deposit insurance.
Table 4.b
Private Credit/GDP (Latin-American countries)










/2 Range of Private Credit/GDP ratio for a fraction of state-owned
bank assets of 19.72% (figure for Chile) and elimination of explicit
deposit insurance.
These results are consistent with the ﬁndings of Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) who conclude that explicit deposit insurance has a
demonstrably detrimental eﬀect on ﬁnancial intermediation. They are also consistent with
18evidence that less developed ﬁnancial markets tend to exhibit a higher government ownership
of banks, as presented by Barth, Caprio Jr. and Levine (1999), La Porta, López de Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny (2000) and others.
3.3 Number of Firms Financed Through Equity Market
Table 5 presents the results of the three speciﬁcations, using Listed Domestic Firms per one
million inhabitants as the dependent variable. Our model yields no clear prediction on the
sign of the likely aﬀect. What we ﬁnd is that considering only explicit deposit insurance
and state-owned bank assets as regressors, the coeﬃcients of both variables are negative and
deposit insurance has a statistically signiﬁcant (at the 5% level) eﬀect on Listed Domestic
Firms/Population. This latter result is robust to including the legal origin dummy variables
in speciﬁcation 3. The coeﬃcient of the explicit deposit insurance variable is equal to -
22.4 in the absence of the legal origin dummies and it changes to -18.4 once these variables
are included in the regression, but it still remains signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Controlling
for income, growth and law enforcement, countries that have an explicit deposit insurance
system have, on average, between 18 and 22 less publicly traded ﬁrms per million inhabitants
than they would otherwise.
19Table 5
Dependent variable: Publicly Traded Domestic Firms/Population








































































Again, the legal origin variables lose their explanatory power when incorporating deposit
insurance and state-owned bank assets into the model. Once the latter variables are included
in the regression, the French and German legal origin dummies are no longer signiﬁcant at
the 1% level (although they stay signiﬁcant at the 5% level), whereas the Scandinavian legal
origin variable is no longer signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The null hypothesis of all legal origin
coeﬃcients being jointly equal to zero fails to be rejected for the 5% signiﬁcance level, but
it is rejected for a 10% level.
203.4 Testing for endogeneity
Summarizing the results of the previous three subsections, we ﬁnd there is evidence sup-
porting the hypothesis of an adverse eﬀect of both explicit and implicit deposit insurance
(controlling for GNP, growth and law enforcement) on the development of external ﬁnance.
In particular, the presence of deposit insurance schemes is associated with a less developed
equity market, a lower number of domestic ﬁrms per capita, and smaller amount of bank
loans extended to the private sector.
In this last subsection we examine if countries with more restrictions to the capital
market exhibit a larger degree of participation by the government in bank asset holdings.
Speciﬁcally, we run the regression of state ownership of banks on three indices: antidirector
rights, creditor rights and one share-one vote rules, all of which we normalize to be between
0 and 1. These indices give information about the level of investor protection in each country
and were obtained from Tables 2 and 4 of La Porta, López de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny
(1998).
The estimation yields the following outcome (p-values are in parenthesis):
SBA = 0.462 - 0.447ADR + 0.023SV + 0.146CR
(0.00) (0.01) (0.80) (0.15) R2 =0 .144
where SBA stands for state-owned bank assets; ADR for anti-director or shareholders’
rights; SV for one-share one-vote and CR for creditors’ rights.
The results are mixed: the evidence suggests that countries with a higher level of share-
holder protection exhibit a signiﬁcantly smaller participation of the government in ﬁnancial
intermediation, whereas this participation is larger in countries with a higher degree of pro-
tection of creditor rights, although it is only signiﬁcant at the 15% level.
We also test the null hypothesis that the sum of all coeﬃcients of the indices is signiﬁ-
21cantly diﬀerent than zero, and we fail to reject it at the 10% level. Hence, we cannot conclude
that, overall, a higher degree of investor protection is associated with higher state-ownership
of bank assets.
From this exercise, we ﬁnd that the data does not signiﬁcantly suggest that countries
with higher degree of capital market restrictions exhibit larger holdings of bank assets by
the government. Hence, there is little evidence of the presence of simultaneity bias in the
estimates.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
The provision of a government safety net to bank depositors through either explicit deposit
insurance or implicitly through state ownership of bank assets has both costs and beneﬁts.
In this paper we examine the impact of deposit guarantees on the development of external
ﬁnancing, such as equity issuance and bank credit to the private sector. We begin with an
equilibrium model in which ﬁrms ﬁnance production either through equity issuance or bank
loans, households allocate wealth between equity and bank deposits, and banks have deposit
liability and make loans. The model predicts that an increase in deposit insurance, either
implicit or explicit, will reduce both equity issuance and bank ﬁnancing of ﬁrms, and may
reduce the number of ﬁrms issuing equity. The reason for this is straightforward. Increasing
depositor’s protection makes bank deposits more attractive than the (riskier) equity shares,
requiring higher rates for the latter and resulting in a lower issuance of stocks. Bank credit
extended to the private sector will also fall in the presence of either explicit or implicit deposit
insurance, as a consequence of a less eﬃcient intermediation process (higher intermediation
costs).
We provide empirical results based on a cross section of 49 countries. The data are
22consistent with the predictions of the model, as we ﬁnd that countries with more extensive
bank deposit insurance tend to have smaller capital and ﬁnancial markets and a lower number
of publicly traded ﬁrms per capita. In contrast to previous work by La Porta, López-de-
Silanes, Vishny and Shleifer, we suggest that these eﬀects are more important than the
origins of a country’s legal system.
Technical Appendix
The comparative statics analysis performed in subsection 2.4 relies on the fact that the rep-
resentative household’s demand for bank deposits and equity rises with their own return rate
and decreases with the probability of default by banks and equity issuing ﬁrms, respectively.
In this appendix we show that the household’s demand for bank deposits will depend directly
on the deposit rate and inversely on the probability of default by the banks. An analogous
proof can be performed to show that equity demand depends directly on the equity return
rate and inversely on the probability of default by the ﬁrms.
Let us rewrite the optimization problem (11)-(14) as follows:
D =a r gm a x ( 1− πS)
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where Ψ =( rS − 1)W − (rS − rD)D.
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(A3)
Taking logs on both sides of equation (A3) and totally diﬀerentiating, setting dπS =
































































Since γ>1, Ψ−1 > 0, and assuming rS >r D i no r d e rt oa c h i e v ean o n - z e r od e m a n df o r
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Hence, demand for bank deposits depends directly on its own return rate and inversely
on the probability that asset holders will not receive their bank deposits back.
24Data Appendix
The data for Explicit Deposit Insurance comes from Table I of Demirgüç-Kunt and De-
tragiache (2002), Table I of Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) and the Data Appendix
from Cull, Senbet and Sorge (2004). A value of ‘1’ is assigned to countries who had an
explicit deposit insurance system in place in 1994. The Index of the share of assets of
the top 10 banks owned or controlled by the government is obtained from Table 2 of La
Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000). For this variable, we considered their measure
for government ownership of banks, which is deﬁned as the percentage share of the assets
of the top 10 banks in a given country owned by the government of that country in 1995,
divided by 100.
PrivateCreditis the ratio of bank debt held by the private sector to GDP, measured for
1996 (except for the case of Nigeria, where the data is from 1994. This ratio was obtained
from the International Financial Statistics Yearbook, edited by the IMF by dividing the sum
of entries 32d-g by entry 99b.
The remaining information was obtained from Table II of LLSV (1997). ExternalCapital
is the ratio of the stock market capitalization held by minorities to gross national product,
for 1994. Domestic Firms stands for the ratio of domestic ﬁr m sl i s t e di nag i v e nc o u n t r y
to its population (in millions), for 1994.
Legal Family identiﬁes the legal origin or Commercial Law of each country, where ‘1’
stands for English, ‘2’ for French, ‘3’ for German and ‘4’ for Scandinavian origin. Rule of
Law is an index of the assessment of law and order tradition in a country (average between
1982 and 1995). GDP growth is the average annual growth of gross domestic product
between 1970 and 1993 and Log GNP is the logarithm of gross national product for 1994.
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